



NEWS FROM THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

FACT SHEET: FCC Takes Action to Secure the Drone Supply Chain

Agency Extends Deadline for Trusted Drones, Seeks Comment on Banning Commercial Sales of Foreign-made Military-Grade Drones

WASHINGTON, July 21, 2026—The FCC today announced steps to secure the drone industry supply chain. First, following a Department of War (DoW) [determination](#), the FCC [extended the exceptions](#) to the FCC's Covered Listing of foreign-produced drones, allowing drones and drone components listed on the DoW [Blue UAS](#) List that meet the Buy America content thresholds or that have been granted Conditional Approval by DoW to continue to receive new authorizations. Second, the Commission released a Public Notice [seeking comment](#) on whether to prohibit the importation or sale for non-USG use of foreign-produced military-grade drones on the Covered List, including swarming drones and drones with infrared technology.

Context

Last December, following an Executive Branch [national security determination](#) that foreign-produced Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS critical components pose unacceptable national security risks, the FCC [added](#) such UAS and UAS critical components to the Covered List. This prohibited the authorization of *new models* of foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components in the U.S.

Over the ensuing months, following further determinations by DoW, the FCC removed from the Covered List UAS and UAS critical components that are on the DoW Blue UAS List (i.e. those cleared for sale to DoW); and those that meet the Buy American standard of 65% of components made in the U.S.; and UAS and UAS critical components that have been granted a [Conditional Approval](#) by DoW following a commitment to onshore production. All these exemptions were set to end on January 1, 2027.

Since last December, we have seen many economic benefits as well: over \$4 billion has flowed to U.S.-based drone and related production companies, opening up hundreds of thousands of square feet of manufacturing space and creating thousands of jobs.

The FCC has also been active in its Drone Dominance docket, accelerating the deployment of drone technology, launching a [proceeding](#) to cut red tape and modernize obsolete regulations to unleash American drone dominance, and taking steps to unleash prime spectrum allocations and innovative experimental licensing.

What the FCC Just Did

The Commission issued two Public Notices earlier today:

- **[Extension of Exceptions](#):** Following a DoW determination regarding the exceptions to the Covered List ban on foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) amended the Covered List. First, PSHSB extended the exceptions for the DoW's Blue UAS List and those that meet the Buy America standard of being assembled in the U.S. with at least 65% of components by value produced in the U.S. for another year until January 1, 2028. Second, PSHSB entirely eliminated the

termination date for foreign produced UAS and UAS critical components that have been granted Conditional Approvals, ensuring these devices will not face restrictions. These actions together will give certainty to industry that UAS and UAS critical components determined to not pose national security concerns will not face imminent restrictions.

- **Foreign-Produced Military-Grade Drone Prohibition:** While the Covered List prospectively bans the authorization for import, marketing, or sale of new models of “covered” equipment, the FCC has the discretion to prohibit the import, marketing, or sale of categories of “covered” equipment if in the public interest. Today, PSHSB and the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) issued a Public Notice seeking comment on whether we should prohibit the import, marketing, or sale of certain military-grade foreign-made UAS and UAS critical components on the FCC’s Covered List. Given that these devices have been found to pose unacceptable national security risks, the FCC tentatively concluded there were strong national security reasons to do so. Comments are due 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.
 - Any prohibition would exclude:
 - UAS and UAS critical components not on the Covered List, either because they were produced in the U.S. or are exempted, such as pursuant to Blue UAS, Buy America, or have received a Conditional Approvals.
 - UAS and UAS critical components imported, marketed, or sold for use by the federal government or for commercial testing and product development.
 - The use or operation of any already-purchased drones.
 - The item seeks comment on extending this prohibition to categories of drones viewed by the U.S. government as having military capability or posing particular national security risks:
 - Swarming drones;
 - Drones specially designed to integrate defense articles;
 - Thermal imaging drones;
 - Drones integrating LiDAR sensing;
 - Aerosol drones capable of dispensing “economic poison” under FAA rules;
 - Drone docking stations;
 - UAS that weigh 55 lbs. or more.

What Has the FCC Done This Month on Drones

- Earlier today, the FCC began [proceedings](#) to revoke two equipment authorizations recently granted to Odyssey Robot for falsely claiming to produce its drone in the U.S. This morning’s FCC action marked the first revocation proceeding against a drone company trying to evade our rules.
- In addition, last week, the FCC issued a Public Notice that sought comment on whether it should prohibit the import, marketing, or sale of certain “covered” equipment, including foreign-produced drones made by several [specific companies](#).
- Earlier this month, the FCC announced a series of [expedited actions](#) to advance the coordinated federal effort to implement the SAFER SKIES Act by clarifying the legal authority and providing guidance that enables state, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement and correctional agencies operating under that Act to take effective counter-drone measures.

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**Media Contact: MediaRelations@fcc.gov / (202) 418-0500
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PUBLIC NOTICE

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Washington, DC 20554

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DA 26-761

Released: July 21, 2026

FCC'S PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU ANNOUNCES EXTENSION OF CONDITIONAL APPROVALS AND EXEMPTION OF CERTAIN UNCREWED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) AND UAS CRITICAL COMPONENTS FROM FCC COVERED LIST

WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, EA Docket No. 21-233

The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC or Commission) Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB or Bureau) maintains a list of equipment and services (Covered List) that have been determined to "pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons."¹ Pursuant to section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Secure Networks Act)² and sections 1.50002(a) and 1.50003 of the Commission's rules,³ PSHSB announces the continued exemption of certain uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components from the Covered List.

Commission Actions on UAS and UAS Critical Components:

On December 22, 2025, PSHSB issued a Public Notice adding all Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List.⁴ This action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons. In that Public Notice, we stated, "[i]f we receive a further specific determination from the Department of War or the Department of Homeland Security that a given UAS, class of UAS, or UAS critical component does not pose unacceptable risks, we will further update the Covered List."⁵

In January 2026, we updated the Covered List to reflect DoW's determinations that, until January 1, 2027, UAS and UAS critical components included on DoW's Blue UAS Cleared List and UAS and

¹ Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-124, 133 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1609) (Secure Networks Act); 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003. For the current version of the Covered List, *see* Federal Communications Commission, *List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act*, <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist> (last updated Apr. 14, 2026).

² 47 U.S.C. § 1601.

³ 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003; *see also* *Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC Programs*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Second Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 14284 (2020) (*Supply Chain Second Report and Order*).

⁴ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components Produced Abroad, and Equipment and Services Listed In Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, to FCC Covered List*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 25-1086 (Dec. 22, 2025) (*UAS Public Notice*).

⁵ *UAS Public Notice* at 3.

UAS critical components that qualify as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard do not pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.⁶ In March 2026, we updated the Covered List to reflect the first Conditional Approvals that the FCC received from the DoW, exempting specific UAS and UAS critical components “which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS” from the Covered List.⁷ We have periodically announced additional exemptions and updated the Covered List accordingly, most recently on June 22, 2026.⁸

National Security Determination:

On July 21, 2026, the Commission received a National Security Determination from DoW, determining (among other things) that certain UAS and UAS critical components either included on DoW’s Blue UAS Cleared List or that qualify as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard continue to not present unacceptable risks to national security and therefore should not be placed on the FCC’s Covered List on January 1, 2027.⁹ This new determination terminates on January 1, 2028 and supersedes the National Security Determination transmitted to the FCC on January 7, 2026.¹⁰

The National Security Determination also states that Conditional Approvals granted for foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components do not terminate on December 31, 2026.¹¹ Rather, “DoW determines that such devices do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons for as long as the applicant for Conditional Approval abides by the onshoring plan outlined in its application and pursuant to updated vetting of the products.”¹² The National Security Determination also states that the Conditional Approval will terminate and result in restoration to the FCC’s Covered List if the applicant fails to adhere to the onshoring plan outlined in the application or if the U.S. Government discovers that the applicant made “a false statement or misrepresentation” in the application.¹³

The Covered List:

We find that the National Security Determination constitutes a specific determination with regard to an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security or safety of United States persons pursuant to section 2 of the Secure Networks Act.¹⁴ Therefore, we conclude that the Commission is required to update the Covered List to reflect this determination. We update the Covered List to exempt: [UAS](#) and [UAS critical components](#) included on DCMA’s Blue UAS Cleared List now and until January 1, 2028; and UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “[domestic end products](#)” under the Buy American Standard (48 CFR § 25.101(a)), until January 1, 2028. We also update the

⁶ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Exemption of Certain Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components from FCC Covered List*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-22 (Jan. 7, 2026) (*Second UAS Public Notice*).

⁷ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Conditional Approval of Certain Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components and Exemption from FCC Covered List*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-253 (Mar. 18, 2026).

⁸ *FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Conditional Approval and Exemption of Certain Uncrewed Aircraft Systems and Routers from FCC Covered List*, WC Docket No. 18-89, DA 26-616 (Jun. 22, 2026) (*UAS and Router Public Notice*).

⁹ National Security Determination at 1.

¹⁰ National Security Determination at 1.

¹¹ See Appendix B.

¹² National Security Determination at 1-2.

¹³ National Security Determination at 2.

¹⁴ Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b)-(d).

Conditional Approval list to remove the original end date of December 31, 2026, for Conditional Approvals granted for foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components.

PSHSB takes this action under its authority and obligation to publish and maintain the Covered List. Sections 1.50002(a) and 1.50003 of the Commission's rules require PSHSB to publish the Covered List on the Commission's website, to maintain and update the Covered List, and to monitor the status of determinations.¹⁵

The Covered List is attached as Appendix A to this Public Notice and is published on the Bureau's website at <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist>.¹⁶ The list of devices that have been granted Conditional Approvals is attached as Appendix B and is available at <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist#conditional-approvals>. The National Security Determination is attached as Appendix C and is available at <https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/NSD-Blue-UAS.pdf>.

We note the continued availability of FCC staff guidance pursuant to sections 0.191 and 0.31(i) of the Commission's rules. Commission staff will provide guidance to TCBs, test labs, and equipment authorization applicants on the impact of these updates.

For further information, please contact Chris Smeenck, Attorney Advisor, Operations and Emergency Management Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, at 202-418-1630 or Chris.Smeenck@fcc.gov.

¹⁵ 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003. See Supply Chain Second Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd at 14319, 14325, paras. 72, 77, 92.

¹⁶ The FCC website also contains a list of certain affiliates and subsidiaries of entities identified on the Covered List. The list of affiliates and subsidiaries does not constitute a comprehensive list of all entities that the Commission may find, upon further examination, to qualify as relevant subsidiaries or affiliates of entities on the Covered List. Those entities, whether or not they currently provide covered communications equipment or services, are subject to the Commission's prohibitions, such as the prohibition against obtaining authorizations for covered equipment. See *Reminder: Communications Equipment And Services On The Covered List Pose An Unacceptable Risk To National Security*, National Security Advisory No. 2025-01, DA 25-927, n.3 (PSHSB Oct. 14, 2025).

APPENDIX A

COVERED LIST (July 21, 2026)*†±

Covered Equipment or Services*	Date of Inclusion on Covered List
Telecommunications equipment produced or provided by Huawei Technologies Company , including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Telecommunications equipment produced or provided by ZTE Corporation , including telecommunications or video surveillance services provided or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by Hytera Communications Corporation , to the extent it is used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company , to the extent it is used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by Dahua Technology Company , to the extent it is used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Information security products, solutions, and services supplied, directly or indirectly, by AO Kaspersky Lab or any of its predecessors, successors, parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates.	March 25, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by China Mobile International USA Inc. subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	March 25, 2022
Telecommunications services provided by China Telecom (Americas) Corp. subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	March 25, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by Pacific Networks Corp. and its wholly-owned subsidiary ComNet (USA) LLC subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	September 20, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	September 20, 2022
Cybersecurity and anti-virus software produced or provided by Kaspersky Lab, Inc. or any of its successors and assignees.	July 23, 2024
Uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country ^{††} —except: (a) UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA's) Blue UAS Cleared List, until January 1, 2028, [#] (b) UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR 25.101(a) , until January 1, 2028; (c) devices which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS ; and (d) foreign-produced “Toy Drones,” as defined in the National Security Determination , and “Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components.” All communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in Section 1709(a)(1) of the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. 118-159).	December 22, 2025 Updated: January 7, 2026 Updated: March 18, 2026 Updated: June 15, 2026 Updated: July 21, 2026
Routers [^] produced in a foreign country, except routers which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS .	March 23, 2026
International telecommunications services provided by Digitalssystem Technology Inc. , subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	July 7, 2026

*The inclusion of producers or providers of equipment or services named on this list should be read to include the subsidiaries and affiliates of such entities.

*Where equipment or services on the list are identified by category, such category should be construed to include only equipment or services capable of the functions outlined in sections 2(b)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b)(2)(A)-(C).

††For purposes of inclusion of UAS and UAS critical components, we incorporate the definitions included in the associated [National Security Determination](#).

±The scope of the Covered List is affected by the [Conditional Approvals](#) that we have received.

#The “Blue UAS list” referred to in the [National Security Determination](#) is the combination of the “Blue UAS Cleared List” at <https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/Cleared-List/> and the list of compliant UAS components and software at <https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/Framework/>. We use the term “Blue UAS Cleared List” to refer to both lists.

^For purposes of inclusion of routers, we incorporate the definitions included in the associated [National Security Determination](#).

APPENDIX B

Conditional Approvals

Updated July 21, 2026

UAS Conditional Approvals	Dates of Conditional Approval*	Routers Conditional Approvals	Dates of Conditional Approval
SiFly Aviation, Inc. Q12 Uncrewed Aircraft System	March 17, 2026 –	Netgear, Inc.’s Nighthawk consumer mesh, mobile and standalone routers (R, RAX, RAXE, RS, MK, MR, M and MH series), Orbi consumer mesh, mobile and standalone routers (RBK, RBE, RBR, RBRE, LBR, LBR and CBK series), cable gateways (CAX series) and cable modems (CM series)	April 14, 2026 – October 1, 2027
Mobilicom SkyHopper Series / M Band / Tactical Data Link, Various Controllers, and ICE, OS3 Security Software	March 17, 2026 –	Adtran Inc.’s Service Delivery Gateway (SDG) class routers	April 14, 2026 – October 1, 2027
ScoutDI Scout 137 Uncrewed Aircraft System	March 17, 2026 –	eero LLC’s eero, eero Pro, eero Max, eero PoE, eero Outdoor, eero Signal, and Amazon Leo routers	April 22, 2026 – October 31, 2027
Verge, Inc. X1 Uncrewed Aircraft System	March 17, 2026 –	Calix, Inc.’s 7u6.2 router, part number (100-06200) Calix, Inc.’s 7p6, 7u6m.2, 7u4txg, and 7u4 broadband routers	May 6, 2026 – October 31, 2027 June 1, 2026 – November 22, 2027
Sees.ai v.USA. 1.0 Uncrewed Aircraft System	April 14, 2026 –	Nokia Corporation’s wireless-fidelity 8 router Nokia Corporation’s Beacons, Open Network Terminal (ONT) Based Beacons, and Fastmile Gateway routers	May 15, 2026 – October 31, 2027 May 18, 2026 – October 31, 2027
Air6 System GmbH’s AIR8 Medium Lifter, AIR8 Compact, AIR4 Rugged, AIR4 Light, AIR4 Micro, AIR4 Nano E, and AIR4 Nano Unmanned Aerial Systems	May 6, 2026 –	Alpha Networks Inc. USA’s 1700 and 2700 series of routers	June 1, 2026 – November 22, 2027

Elevon Aerial, LLC, doing business as Elevon Aerial AG, Z30, Z50, and Z80 Uncrewed Aircraft Systems	May 15, 2026 –	Sagemcom USA, LLC's FAST3994, FAST3897, FAST5698, FAST5699, and FAST5999 routers	June 4, 2026 – December 5, 2027
Blueflite, Inc.'s Cobalt 461 Uncrewed Aircraft System (UAS) and related UAS critical components including data transmission devices, communications systems, and flight controllers	May 26, 2026 –	Miri Technologies, Inc.'s Miri X10 Travel router	June 12, 2026 – December 12, 2027
Verity AG's Series 4 Indoor Autonomous Inventory System Uncrewed Aircraft System	May 26, 2026 –	Arcadyan Technology Corporation's routers for T-Mobile 5G FWA broadband devices, which includes the G5AR, G5MAR, GxMAR, GxMAR-ODU, GxAR Series (5G FWA); AT&T BGW 720; and Verizon C46BE (XC Series), CR100B (WG Series), CE1000A, and E3200 (WE Series)	June 12, 2026 – December 12, 2027
Air VEV, Inc.'s 120C and 060C Unmanned Aerial Systems	May 26, 2026 –	Hitron Technologies Americas, Inc.'s DOCSIS 4.0 Wi-Fi Gateway, DOCSIS 3.1 Wi-Fi Gateway, XGSPON Wi-Fi Gateway, Standalone Wi-Fi routers, 5G FWA Wi-Fi Gateway, and 5G FWA Wi-Fi Hotspot	June 22, 2026 – December 18, 2027
Innovation First International, Inc.'s VEX AIR Uncrewed Aircraft System	June 4, 2026 –	Vantiva USA, LLC's CWA438TX router	July 8, 2026 – January 3, 2028
Flock Group, Inc. (doing business as Flock Safety) Flock Alpha Uncrewed Aircraft System	June 12, 2026 –	Gemtek Technology Co., Ltd.'s WRTQ-411BE and WNRFFQ-113BE routers	July 10, 2026 – January 3, 2028
ABZ Innovation Kft.'s L50 Uncrewed Aircraft System	June 12, 2026 –	Gryphon Safety Online, Inc.'s Parental Control WiFi Router	July 20, 2026 – January 10, 2028
Real-Time Robotics, Inc.'s HERA Tactical Uncrewed Aircraft Systems Platform (both standard and VEGA)	June 22, 2026 –	Sercomm Corporation's Air4992 Wi-Fi 7 Router	July 20, 2026 – January 10, 2028
Ceres Air LLC's Uncrewed Aircraft Systems: C40, C31, C26, C20, and C6	June 22, 2026 –		

*Consistent with the [National Security Determination](#) (July 21, 2026), UAS Conditional Approvals that do not reflect a termination date will remain effective indefinitely, so long as the entity that received Conditional Approval abides by the onshoring plan outlined in its Conditional Approval application and pursuant to updated vetting of the products.

APPENDIX C

**National Security Determination on Foreign-Produced Uncrewed Aircraft Systems
and Uncrewed Aircraft Systems Critical Components**

INDUSTRIAL BASE POLICY

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
3011 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

**SUBJECT: National Security Determination on Foreign-Produced Uncrewed Aircraft Systems
and Uncrewed Aircraft Systems Critical Components**

Pursuant to the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 and the National Security Determination sent to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) by an Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise,¹ the Department of War (DoW) is updating our determination that certain Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country² do not currently pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons and therefore should not be added to the FCC's Covered List on Friday, January 1, 2027.

The DoW has determined that UAS³ and UAS critical components⁴ included on DoW's Blue UAS list continue to not present unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the safety and security of U.S. persons as described in the January 7, 2026 National Security Determination on the Threat posed by certain UAS and certain UAS critical components.⁵ This determination includes UAS and UAS critical components included on the Blue UAS list currently and until Saturday, January 1, 2028.

Additionally, until Saturday, January 1, 2028, the DoW has determined that UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as "domestic end products" under the Buy American Standard do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the safety and security of U.S. persons.⁶

This determination extends the National Security Determination transmitted to the FCC on Wednesday, January 7, 2026,⁷ and shall terminate on Saturday, January 1, 2028, unless superseded by a newer determination.

DoW further clarifies that Conditional Approvals that have been granted for foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components⁸ will not terminate on Thursday, December 31, 2026. Instead, DoW determines that such devices do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons for as long as the

¹ <https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/National-Security-Determination-for-UAS.pdf> at 2.

² For purposes of this determination, "UAS and UAS critical components" does not refer to any device listed in Section 1709 of Public Law 118-159, the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025.

³ <https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/UAS-Cleared-List/>

⁴ <https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/UAS-Framework/>

⁵ <https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/NSD-FCC-Covered-List-Waiver0126.pdf>

⁶ 48 CFR § 25.101(a).

⁷ <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-22A1.pdf>

⁸ <https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/UAS-Guidance-Submissions-Conditional-Approvals.pdf>

applicant for Conditional Approval abides by the onshoring plan outlined in its application and pursuant to updated vetting of the products.⁹ Failure of an applicant to abide by its onshoring plan or the discovery by the U.S. Government of a false statement or misrepresentation in the Conditional Approval application will result in termination of Conditional Approval and restoration to the FCC's Covered List. Entities seeking Conditional Approval for foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components must submit their Conditional Approval application to the U.S. Government by Saturday, January 1, 2028.

RAMDASS,VICKY. Digitally signed by
SHASHINDERAJ.10
AKX1MCO2P10

Vic S. Ramdass, PhD.
Acting Assistant Secretary of War
for Industrial Base Policy

Attachment:
Annex A – Definitions

⁹ <https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/UAS-Guidance-Submissions-Conditional-Approvals.pdf>

Annex A – Definitions

Definitions:

FCC: For the purpose of this determination, the term “FCC” shall mean the Federal Communications Commission.

Domestic End Product: For the purpose of this determination, the term “domestic end product” has the meaning found in 48 CFR § 25.101(a)

Uncrewed Aircraft (UA): For the purpose of this determination, the term “uncrewed aircraft (UA)” has the meaning found in 47 CFR § 88.5: *An aircraft operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft.*

Uncrewed Aircraft System (UAS): For the purpose of this determination, the term “uncrewed aircraft system (UAS)” has the meaning found in 47 CFR 88.5: *An Uncrewed Aircraft and its associated elements (including an uncrewed aircraft station, communication links, and the components not on board the UA that control the UA) that are required for the safe and efficient operation of the UA in the airspace of the United States.*

UAS Critical Components: For the purpose of this determination, the term “UAS critical components” includes,, but is not limited to the following UAS components and any associated software:

- Data transmission devices;
- Communications systems;
- Flight controllers;
- Ground control stations and UAS controllers;
- Navigation systems;
- Sensors and Cameras;
- Batteries and Battery Management Systems; or
- Motors.



PUBLIC NOTICE

Federal Communications Commission
45 L Street NE
Washington, DC 20554

News Media Information 202-418-0500
Internet: www.fcc.gov

DA 26-758
Released: July 21, 2026

FCC SEEKS COMMENT ON PROHIBITING THE IMPORTATION AND MARKETING OF CERTAIN FOREIGN-PRODUCED MILITARY-GRADE UNCREWED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) AND UAS CRITICAL COMPONENTS FOR NON-U.S. GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE WITH SWARMING CAPABILITIES

PS Docket No. 26-189

Comments Due: 30 days after publication in the *Federal Register*

Introduction

By this Public Notice, the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to "pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons" (covered equipment).¹ In particular, we propose to apply such prohibitions to foreign-produced uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components that are both on the Covered List² and are "military-grade" as defined below.³

¹ Pursuant to sections 2(a) and (d) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, and sections 1.50002 and 1.50003 of the Commission's rules, the Federal Communications Commission's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) publishes a list of communications equipment and services that have been determined by one of the sources specified in that statute to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons (covered equipment). Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-124, 133 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1609) (Secure Networks Act); 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003. For the current version of the Covered List, see Federal Communications Commission, *List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act*, <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist> (last updated January 7, 2026) (FCC Covered List). The process by which the Commission would exercise this authority was established in the *Equipment Authorization Security Second Report and Order (EA Security 2d R&O)*. *Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program*, Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 232, FCC 25-71, paras. 40-50 (2025) (*EA Security 2d R&O*); 47 CFR § 2.939(e).

² The FCC's Covered list currently includes: Uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country†† —except: (a) UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA's) Blue UAS Cleared List, until January 1, 2027,[#] (b) UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as "domestic end products" under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR § 25.101(a), until January 1, 2027; (c) devices which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS; and (d) foreign-produced "Toy Drones," as defined in the National Security Determination, and "Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components."

³ See *infra* at 4-6.

These prohibitions would not apply to any UAS or UAS critical components produced domestically. Additionally, these prohibitions would not apply to any importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development. Moreover, these prohibitions would not apply to any non-military-grade UAS or UAS critical components. Finally, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect continued use or operation of already-purchased UAS or UAS critical components. We seek comment on these proposals and the relevant factors, including national security, economic, and supply chain considerations, that would justify prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of such previously authorized covered equipment.

Background

In November 2022, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) adopted rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List.⁴ However, the Commission did not revoke previously granted authorizations of covered equipment.⁵ In October 2025, the Commission adopted the *EA Security Second R&O* which, among other things, established a procedure to limit the scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the underlying authorization.⁶ The Commission noted that its goal is to mitigate potential national security risks associated with covered equipment in the nation's supply chain that was authorized prior to a Covered List addition under 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b).⁷

The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to “institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these prohibitions to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered List,” and it delegated authority to PSHSB and OET to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the framework and process outlined in the *EA Security Second R&O*.⁸ The Commission gave specific directives to PSHSB and OET regarding how to analyze and implement the new procedures.⁹

On December 22, 2025, PSHSB added all UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List.¹⁰ This action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that UAS produced in a foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.¹¹

⁴ See generally *Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program*; *Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Competitive Bidding Program*, Report and Order, Order, and FNPRM, 37 FCC Rcd 13493, 13509-98, paras. 32-263 (2022) (*EA Security R&O and FNPRM*). The Commission explained that this proceeding builds upon the important ongoing efforts by the Commission, Congress, and the Executive Branch to take further action to protect the security of America's critical communications networks and equipment supply chains. *Id.* at 13494-95, para. 1; see also *id.* at 13497-505, 13507-08, paras. 5-23, 31.

⁵ *Id.* at 13535, para. 107.

⁶ *EA Security 2d R&O*, FCC 25-71, paras. 40-50; 47 CFR §§ 2.939(e), 2.803, 2.1204.

⁷ *Id.* at paras. 32, 40.

⁸ *Id.* at paras. 45, 48.

⁹ *Id.* at paras. 42-50.

¹⁰ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components Produced Abroad, and Equipment and Services Listed In Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, to FCC Covered List*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 25-1086 (Dec. 22, 2025) (*December 22 Public Notice*).

¹¹ See *December 22 Public Notice*. Separately, the National Security Determination found similar “unacceptable risks” were posed by “all communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in Section 1709(a)(1) of the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act.” *Id.* at 2.

The National Security Determination provided that the identified UAS and UAS critical components should be included on the Covered List, unless DoW or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given UAS or class of UAS, or a specific UAS critical component, does not pose risks to U.S. national security. The FCC established a process for entities to request individual Conditional Approvals for their covered UAS and UAS critical components by submitting the required information, and DoW has granted several such Conditional Approvals.¹²

On January 7, 2026, the Commission received a subsequent National Security Determination from the Department of War (DoW) stating that certain equipment should be removed from the Covered List because it does not pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.¹³ Accordingly, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt: UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) Blue UAS Cleared List until January 1, 2027; and UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as "domestic end products" under the Buy American Standard (48 CFR § 25.101(a)), until January 1, 2027. Additionally, on June 15, 2026, based on a National Security Determination from DoW, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt "Toy Drones" as defined in the National Security Determination and "Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components."¹⁴

On March 27, 2026, PSHSB and OET released a Public Notice (*March 27 Public Notice*) seeking comment on a proposal to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of equipment that had been placed on the Covered List in 2024 or earlier but was originally authorized prior to the adoption of the Commissions 2022 equipment authorization and national security rules.¹⁵ The *March 27 Public Notice* explained that those additions to the Covered List were made pursuant to a specific national security determination made by Congress, which the Commission found constituted a "specific determination that such equipment poses an 'unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.'"¹⁶ PSHSB and OET sought comment on whether maintaining such authorizations would undermine the Commission's national security framework and whether prohibiting continued importation and marketing would better serve the public interest.¹⁷

On June 26, 2026, after review of the record, PSHSB and OET issued a second Public Notice (*June 26 Public Notice*) summarizing the comments received, evaluating the technical, economic, and national security considerations raised by commenters, and assessing the public interest implications of the proposed prohibition.¹⁸ The *June 26 Public Notice* concluded that continued importation and

¹² The UAS and UAS critical components that have been granted Conditional Approval are listed on the Commission's Covered List webpage: <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist>.

¹³ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Exemption of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components from FCC Covered List*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-22 (Jan. 7, 2026) (*January 7 Public Notice*).

¹⁴ *FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces that "Toy Drones" and "Toy Drones that Contain Foreign-Produced Components" are Removed from the FCC Covered List*, WC Docket 18-89, Public Notice, DA 26-588 (Jun. 15, 2026) (*Toy Drones Public Notice*).

¹⁵ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology Seek Comment on Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier*, PS Docket No. 26-72, Public Notice, DA 26-294 (PSHSB/OET Mar. 27, 2026), 91 Fed. Reg. 17275 (Apr. 6, 2026) (*March 27 Public Notice*).

¹⁶ See *March 27 Public Notice*.

¹⁷ *March 27 Public Notice* at 3-5.

¹⁸ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology Prohibit the Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier*, PS Docket No. 26-72, Public Notice, DA 26-635 (Jun. 26, 2026) (*June 26 Public Notice*).

marketing of equipment authorized before the adoption of the Commission's 2022 rules posed unacceptable risks to national security when imported or marketed in the United States.¹⁹

The Commission therefore decided that adoption of the prohibition was warranted and announced that the prohibition would become effective 10 days after publication in the Federal Register. The *June 26 Public Notice* emphasized that expedited action was necessary because a delayed, but impending prohibition, could incentivize importers and markets to accelerate shipments of covered equipment into the U.S market, which is a result that is directly contrary to the purpose of the Notice.²⁰ Following the release of the *June 26 Public Notice*, the Commission updated its website to reflect the newly adopted prohibitions.²¹ The Order took effect on July 16, 2026, 10 days after Federal Register publication.²²

On July 17, 2026, PSHSB and OET initiated a proceeding to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components, and certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025.²³

Today, we initiate another proceeding to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment: foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components on the FCC's Covered List that qualify as "military-grade" as defined below.

Discussion

The Commission has legal authority to review an existing authorization for covered equipment, and to revoke such authorization pursuant to current rules.²⁴ Under section 2.939(a), the FCC may "revoke . . . any equipment authorization" for various reasons, including "conditions coming to the attention of the Commission which would warrant it in refusing to grant an original application."²⁵ Likewise, under section 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET "may place limitations on an existing authorization for covered equipment authorizations to prohibit continued importation or marketing" of such equipment.²⁶

Scope. Pursuant to section 2.939(e), we propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of any previously-authorized military-grade UAS or UAS critical component that is listed on the Covered List. We propose to limit the proposed prohibitions to military-grade UAS or UAS critical components, which we define on the basis of other agencies' regulations governing certain high-risk

¹⁹ *June 26 Public Notice* at 3.

²⁰ *June 26 Public Notice* at 8.

²¹ See <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist>.

²² See Federal Communications Commission, Prohibiting Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier, 91 Fed. Reg. 41023 (July 6, 2026).

²³ *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology Seek Comment on Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Certain Covered UAS and UAS Critical Components and Equipment Listed in Section 1709 of FY2025 NDAA*, PS Docket No. 26-184, Public Notice, DA 26-742 (Jul. 17, 2026).

²⁴ *EA Security R&O and FNPRM*, 37 FCC Rcd at 13537, para. 114.

²⁵ 47 CFR § 2.939(a).

²⁶ 47 CFR § 2.939(e). "OET and PSHSB will issue a public notice announcing the intent to limit the scope of equipment authorizations to prohibit the further importation or marketing of specified devices identified by class, type, or other description sufficient to identify the devices." 47 CFR § 2.939(e)(1). "The public notice will include an assessment of the impact of the proposed prohibition with consideration of public interest factors, including: the unacceptable risks the equipment was found to pose, the economic and supply chain impacts, and any other criteria as specified by the Commission. The public notice should give particular weight to the specific determination(s), and any accompanying rules or analyses, through which the relevant equipment was added to the Covered List. 47 CFR § 2.939(e)(2).

UAS, and following discussions with our partners in other national security agencies. Specifically, we consider military-grade UAS and UAS critical components to be any of the following:

- (1) UAS that weigh 55 pounds or more on takeoff, i.e. UAS that are not “small unmanned aircraft” pursuant to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules.²⁷
 - These UAS are considered “larger platforms” that offer greater payload capacity, endurance, and range, which make them suitable for military operations requiring heavy sensors, communications equipment, or specialized weapons systems (i.e., deep-strike operations, persistent wide-area surveillance, electronic warfare, and cargo resupply).
 - Their increased power and stability also allow them to operate effectively in more demanding environments, making them highly effective for various missions.
 - UAS that weigh over 55 pounds or more operating individually or in a swarm have the capability to carry out a significant attack on the U.S. homeland.
- (2) UAS capable of dispensing “economic poison” under FAA rules.²⁸
 - These UAS can be used to deliver hazardous substances in ways that bypass traditional defense and detection systems. Their ability to fly autonomously, reach remote areas, and carry dangerous materials make them ideal for military operations.
 - Aerosol dispensing platforms operating independently or in a swarm can carry out mass chemical or biological attacks against U.S. persons and our food supply.
- (3) UAS that contain or integrate sensors capable of thermal imaging (i.e. the capability to capture and translate the difference in temperature between objects, as well as an object's heat signature and residual heat signature).²⁹
 - UAS that feature these sensors are ideal for military use because their ability to operate effectively in low visibility environments enhances night operations, covert surveillance, and targeting capabilities.
 - These capabilities allow forces to bypass camouflage, navigate in total darkness, and identify concealed heat signatures that are entirely invisible to standard optical sensors and the human eye.
 - These capabilities also make it more difficult to protect critical infrastructure, maintain operational security, and prevent intelligence collection in sensitive areas.
- (4) UAS that contain or integrate sensors capable of Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), a “remote sensing technology that measures distance by illuminating a target with a laser and analyzing the reflected light.”³⁰
 - These UAS offer military utility by providing enhanced capability to conduct detailed three-dimensional terrain mapping, penetrate dense foliage to reveal hidden structures, assist in autonomous navigation in GPS-denied environments, and conduct covert reconnaissance under a range of environmental conditions.

²⁷ See 14 CFR § 107.3. FAA rules governing the operation of such UAS are contained at 14 CFR Part 107.

²⁸ See 14 CFR § 137.3. The FAA defines an “economic poison” as any substance intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating pests (insects, rodents, nematodes, fungi, weeds), viruses, or intended for use as a plant defoliant, or drying agent.

²⁹ See “Thermal Imagers,” Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (last updated April 10, 2025), <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/thermal-imagers> (last accessed June 26, 2026).

³⁰ “Guidelines for the Use of Terrestrial LiDAR Scanners in Criminal Justice Applications,” Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs at 3 (March 2022), <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/304452.pdf> (last accessed June 26, 2026).

- (5) UAS docking stations, defined as multipurpose systems that enable UAS to land safely, take off, recharge and/or replace batteries, and transfer data and payload.³¹
- UAS docking stations are infrastructure that enable persistent, 24/7 autonomous operations allowing faster, more continuous intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other mission workflows.
 - Additionally, by serving as coordinated launch, recovery, and servicing nodes, docking stations facilitate the capability for large-scale drone swarms to support military operations.
- (6) UAS “specially designed to incorporate a defense article.”³²
- These UAS are ideal for military use because they can enable combat commanders to conduct unparalleled precision strikes, kinetic effect delivery, and electronic warfare capabilities at a significantly lower cost and risk to human life than manned aircraft.
 - They also extend range, persistence, or precision beyond traditional platforms.
- (7) Swarming UAS, defined as:
- Ground control stations purpose-built for, or UAS integrated with flight control or vehicle management systems specially designed for, managing drone swarms, consisting of UAS that operate autonomously (without human intervention) to coordinate with each other, avoid collisions, maintain formations, and dynamically respond to changes in operational or threat environments, or if weaponized, synchronize targeting activities across multiple drones³³; or
 - UAS purpose-built to perform flights in coordinated and synchronized formations, including applications such as multi-UAS light shows, where numerous illuminated UAS work together to create synchronized aerial displays.
- This capability enables large numbers of UAS to coordinate autonomously, making them harder to detect, track, and counter.
 - Swarm-enabled UAS can overwhelm defenses, provide persistent surveillance, and create complex operational challenges that strain traditional air defense systems, which pose significant risks to public safety and national security.

This prohibition on importation and marketing would not apply to any non-military-grade UAS or UAS critical components, nor would it apply to any domestically produced UAS or UAS critical components or to any other already-authorized covered equipment. It would also only apply to *covered* UAS and UAS critical components and would therefore not apply to any UAS or UAS critical components that are exempt from the Covered List—including UAS and UAS critical components identified on the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA’s) Blue UAS Cleared List; UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR § 25.101(a); and UAS and UAS critical components granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS. Any UAS or UAS critical component subsequently removed from the Covered List, such as through Conditional Approval, would also be exempt from this prohibition. Furthermore, this prohibition would not apply to importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the

³¹ Carlo Giorgio Grlj, Nino Krznar, and Marko Pranjic, “A Decade of UAV Docking Stations: A Brief Overview of Mobile and Fixed Landing Platforms,” *Drones*, at 2 (Jan. 10, 2022), <https://www.mdpi.com/2504-446X/6/1/17> (last accessed June 26, 2026). A docking station is a “UAS” and “UAS critical components” under the definitions in the National Security Determination, because it is an “uncrewed aircraft station” and/or a “ground control station.” See *December 22 Public Notice* at 8, 9.

³² See 22 CFR § 121.1, Category VIII(a)(5). “Defense article” is defined at 22 CFR § 120.31.

³³ See 22 CFR § 121.1, Category VIII(h)(12). Such systems are “UAS critical components,” because they are “flight controllers,” “UAS controllers,” “communications systems,” and or “navigation systems.” See *December 22 Public Notice* at 9.

purpose of commercial testing and product development. Finally, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect the continued use or operation of already-purchased UAS or UAS critical components.

We seek comment on this list of prohibitions. Does this list adequately capture military-grade UAS and UAS critical components? Are there UAS and UAS critical components that are listed above, but are not military-grade? Are there UAS and UAS critical components that are not listed above that are military-grade?

Below, we provide a brief analysis of the relevant factors that would justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized covered equipment and tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment serves the public interest.

National security impacts. We start with national security concerns, because, as the Commission noted in the *EA Security Second R&O*, “[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”³⁴ In the *EA Security Second R&O*, the Commission stated that older models of covered equipment, which are still widely sold in the U.S., pose an unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed in the United States, “not only when such equipment is new to the market.”³⁵ The Commission agreed with commenters who pointed out that certain previously authorized devices that are now considered covered equipment “likely remain[] marketable in the United States” and “may present continuing national security threats.”³⁶ The Commission also directed PSHSB and OET to “give particular weight to the fact that the relevant equipment was determined to pose ‘an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons.’”³⁷

Subject to exceptions,³⁸ an Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise, including appropriate national security agencies, one of whom was the DoW,³⁹ specifically determined that UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries “pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons.”⁴⁰ This determination of “unacceptable risks” was based on an assessment of “threats from unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data exfiltration, supply chain vulnerabilities, and other potential threats to the homeland.”⁴¹ We tentatively accept this determination and “give [it] particular weight,” as the Commission directed.⁴² This determination, which covered foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components generally, necessarily includes already-authorized foreign-produced military-grade UAS and UAS critical components.

Therefore, based on the *EA Security Second R&O* and the UAS and UAS critical component National Security Determination, we tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and

³⁴ *EA Security 2d R&O*, FCC 25-71, para. 45 (quoting *Haig v. Agee*, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).

³⁵ *EA Security 2d R&O*, FCC 25-71, para. 40.

³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ *EA Security 2d R&O*, FCC 25-71, para. 45. PSHSB’s and OET’s adjudication with respect to the 2024-or-earlier relied primarily on national security considerations arising from the relevant specific determinations. See *December 22 Public Notice*; see also *January 7 Public Notice*.

³⁸ See *January 7 Public Notice* at 2; *Toy Drones Public Notice* at 3.

³⁹ See *Opposition of Department of War to Petition for Reconsideration*, ET Docket Nos. 26-22 and 26-23 (filed Apr. 6, 2026).

⁴⁰ UAS/UAS Critical Component National Security Determination at 2, 4.

⁴¹ UAS/UAS Critical Component National Security Determination at 2.

⁴² *EA Security 2d R&O*, FCC 25-71, para. 45.

marketing of previously authorized covered military-grade UAS and UAS critical components as described above is necessary to protect national security by mitigating risks to the U.S. communications sector.

We also believe that military-grade foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components might pose even particularly acute national security or related risks, given their military-grade capabilities. We invite comment on whether military-grade UAS and UAS critical components, as described above, pose particularly acute national security risks of the sort described in the National Security Determination.

Economic and supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the potential economic and supply chain impacts of prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of already-authorized covered military-grade UAS and UAS critical components. How would this proposed action affect the financial interests of consumers, providers, and manufacturers in the communications sector? As the Commission noted in the *EA Security Second R&O*, it may consider “countervailing economic concerns when implementing the prohibitions for already-authorized devices.”⁴³ What are the economic or supply chain considerations that weigh either in favor or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to provide data that we should consider in our analysis.

We tentatively conclude that our proposed action would not have substantial economic and supply chain impacts. Outside of importation, marketing, and sales to the U.S. government, which are excluded from the scope of this proposed action, military-grade UAS and UAS critical components represent a minority of the remaining UAS and UAS critical component market.⁴⁴ Recreational consumers comprise the majority of individual drone operators and are unlikely to fly military-grade UAS.⁴⁵ While foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components dominate the recreational market, domestic production of UAS and UAS critical components in the higher-end, military-grade subsectors is more prevalent.⁴⁶ Moreover, several of the categories of UAS and UAS critical components are subject to U.S. export controls or other regulatory restrictions and likely comprise a small market within the United States.

Do commenters agree that economic and supply chain impacts are relatively minor and contained? Are there domestically-produced alternatives for military-grade UAS and UAS critical components? Would this proposal be cost-effective for the public in terms of obtaining trusted equipment? Would providers’ compliance costs decrease as they replace covered equipment with trusted equipment? We strongly encourage commenters to supply data and other specific evidence of economic costs to this prohibition.

On the other hand, we seek comment on any economic benefits that might arise as a result of these prohibitions. We note that after the initial update to the Covered List, billions of dollars have already been raised by domestic UAS producers, creating thousands of U.S. manufacturing jobs.⁴⁷

⁴³ *EA Security 2d R&O*, FCC 25-71, para. 46.

⁴⁴ See U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, *Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)*, <https://www.trade.gov/unmanned-aircraft-systems> (June 30, 2026).

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ See, e.g., *Zipline Charts Drone Delivery Expansion with \$600M in New Funding*, TechCrunch (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://techcrunch.com/2026/01/21/zipline-charts-drone-delivery-expansion-with-600m-in-new-funding/>; *BRINC Announces New Seattle Factory and Launch of Next-Generation 911 Response Drone*, BRINC, <https://brincdrones.com/news/brinc-announces-new-seattle-factory-and-launch-of-next-generation-911-response-drone/>; *Flytrex to Open U.S. Factory*, UAV Coach, <https://uavcoach.com/flytrex-us-factory/>; *DMR Technologies to Launch Full-Scale U.S. Drone Manufacturing Facility in Lafayette*, Opportunity Louisiana, <https://www.opportunitylouisiana.gov/news/dmr-technologies-to-launch-full-scale-u-s-drone-manufacturing-facility-in-lafayette>; *High-Speed Combat Drone Production Starts at New U.S. Anduril Plant in Days*, Defense News (Mar. 19, 2026), <https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2026/03/19/high-speed-combat-drone-production->

Additionally, billions more have been committed for domestic production of UAS and UAS critical components, which are expected to generate additional jobs.⁴⁸ These investments include capital from domestic investors as well as foreign investors supporting U.S. manufacturing.⁴⁹ We tentatively conclude that the proposed prohibitions of military-grade UAS and UAS critical components would similarly generate substantial investment in domestic production, given the loss of foreign-produced supply. Do commenters agree? We seek comment on the economic effects of the likely investment in U.S. production that this proposed prohibition would yield.

Public interest analysis. We tentatively conclude that prohibiting the importation and marketing of previously authorized covered military-grade foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components is consistent with the public interest, because it protects American communications networks from devices specifically determined by an Executive Branch interagency body to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.”⁵⁰

We also tentatively conclude that there are no public interest factors that outweigh our tentative conclusion regarding the proposed ban on import and marketing of this previously authorized equipment. After all, as the Commission noted in the *EA Security Second R&O*, “[i]t is obvious and unarguable that

[starts-at-new-us-anduril-plant-in-days/](#); *Unusual Machines Expands Orlando Manufacturing Footprint to Support Battery Operations*, Morningstar, <https://www.morningstar.com/news/accesswire/1182163msn/unusual-machines-expands-orlando-manufacturing-footprint-to-support-battery-operations>; *Swarm Aero Raises Series A, Plans Drone Factory*, Axios (Mar. 11, 2026), <https://www.axios.com/2026/03/11/swarm-aero-seriesa-drone-factory>; *Tekever Expands into Americas with First U.S. Office*, FlightGlobal (May 2026), <https://www.flightglobal.com/archive/2026/05/tekever-expands-into-americas-with-first-us-office/>; *Echodyne Expands Public Safety Radar Applications Through Partnership with Axon*, Echodyne, <https://www.echodyne.com/newsroom/echodyne-expands-public-safety-radar-applications-through-partnership-with-axon>; ([echodyne.com](#) in Bing) *Zipline Soars to \$7.6 Billion Valuation as U.S. Drone Delivery Bets Grow*, Reuters (Jan. 20, 2026), <https://www.reuters.com/business/zipline-soars-76-billion-valuation-us-drone-delivery-bets-2026-01-20/>; *Skydio Series F*, Skydio, <https://www.skydio.com/blog/skydio-series-f>; *Flytrex Drone Delivery Texas Factory*, DroneDJ (May 21, 2026), <https://dronedj.com/2026/05/21/flytrex-drone-delivery-texas-factory/>; *Drone Home: BRINC Moving to Massive New HQ and Factory in Seattle Amid Rapid Growth*, GeekWire (Mar. 24, 2026), <https://www.geekwire.com/2026/drone-home-brinc-moving-to-massive-new-hq-and-factory-in-seattle-amid-startups-rapid-growth/>.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., *Skydio Commits \$3.5 Billion to Expand U.S. Manufacturing and Secure American Drone Leadership*, Skydio (Apr. 24, 2026), <https://www.skydio.com/blog/skydio-commits-usd3-5-billion-to-expand-u-s-manufacturing-and-secure-american-drone-leadership>; *Project Millennium*, Neros (Feb. 19, 2026), <https://www.neros.tech/articles/project-millennium>; *AV Partners with City of Albuquerque and State of New Mexico in Defense Manufacturing Expansion*, AeroVironment (Mar. 3, 2026), <https://www.avinc.com/2026/03/03/av-partners-with-city-of-albuquerque-and-state-of-new-mexico-in-defense-manufacturing-expansion/>; *Denton City Council Seals \$870K Incentive Deal for Drone Factory in 4–3 Vote*, Community Impact (Apr. 22, 2026), <https://communityimpact.com/dallas-fort-worth/denton/business/2026/04/22/denton-city-council-seals-870k-incentive-deal-for-drone-factory-in-4-3-vote/>; *Quantum Cyber Signs LOI to Acquire U.S. Manufacturing Facility to Support Mass-Scale Autonomous Drone Production*, GlobeNewswire (June 8, 2026), <https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/06/08/3307956/0/en/quantum-cyber-signs-loi-to-acquire-an-estimated-43-000-square-foot-u-s-based-manufacturing-facility-to-support-mass-scale-autonomous-drone-production.html>.

⁴⁹ See, e.g., *Red Cat Holdings Completes Upsized Public Equity Offering*, Globe and Mail, (May 19, 2026), <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/stocks/RCAT/pressreleases/2027276/red-cat-holdings-completes-upsize-public-equity-offering/>; *Exclusive: ORQA Launches Independent U.S. Company*, Tectonic Defense, (May 5, 2026), <https://www.tectonicdefense.com/exclusive-orqa-launches-independent-us-company/>; *PDW Raises Over \$110M in Series B Financing to Expand Product Offerings, Strengthen Engineering Capabilities, and Scale Production of Modular Military Drones*, PR Newswire, (May 25, 2026), <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pdw-raises-over-110m-in-series-b-financing-to-expand-product-offerings-strengthen-engineering-capabilities-and-scale-production-of-modular-military-drones-302724165.html>.

⁵⁰ 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b); see also *EA Security R&O* and *FNPRM*, 37 FCC Red at 13511-13513, paras. 40-43.

no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”⁵¹ We seek comment on this public interest analysis. Do commenters agree that the national security benefits outweigh any negative economic or supply chain factors? Are there any other public interest considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action?

We invite commenters to provide any information that would assist the Commission in its balancing of the need to address the national security risks posed by the continued importation and marketing of previously-authorized covered equipment that are military-grade UAS and UAS critical components in communications networks with the impact of the proposed prohibitions on government partners, consumers, industry, and the public at large.

Implementation

Existing authorizations. We clarify that, if this prohibition is adopted, the continued use or operation of previously-authorized military-grade UAS and UAS critical components that are already in the hands of users would remain authorized. This is consistent with the approach that the Commission adopted in the *EA Security Second R&O*. The limitation on existing authorizations would not result in the revocation of an existing authorization of covered equipment and, therefore, would not affect the continued use or operation of devices that consumers already possess.

Implementation timeline. We propose that all parties must cease all importation and marketing activities regarding such previously-authorized military-grade UAS and UAS critical components 180 days after publication in the Federal Register. We believe that this timeline is reasonable and strikes the appropriate balance between addressing the national security concerns and minimizing any potential adverse economic or supply chain impacts. Although the Commission’s prohibition with respect to covered equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier took effect within 10 days of publication in the Federal Register, given the expected large scope of equipment at issue in this proposed prohibition, as well as the shorter time that such foreign produced military-grade UAS and UAS critical components have been listed on the Covered List, we believe that a more extended time period to permit an orderly transition is appropriate.

We seek comment on the proposed timeline and invite input from responsible parties and relevant manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and other interested entities. Specifically, we request that commenters address implementation considerations including the quantity of devices that have already been imported into the U.S. and are available for or being held for marketing or sale, new or recently updated device models that are en route to the U.S. or pending shipment, and devices that are subject to executed distribution, marketing, or sales agreements, but have not yet entered the supply chain.

Procedural Matters

Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR §§ 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this document. Comments may be filed using the Commission’s Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS).

- *Electronic Filers:* Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: <https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs>.
- *Paper Filers:* Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing.
 - Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. **All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.**
 - Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission’s Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC’s mailing contractor at 9050

⁵¹ *EA Security 2d R&O*, FCC 25-71, para. 45 (quoting *Haig*, 453 U.S. at 307).

Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building.

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- *People with Disabilities*: To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.

The proceeding this Public Notice initiates shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance with the Commission’s *ex parte* rules.⁵² Persons making *ex parte* presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral *ex parte* presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the *ex parte* presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation.

If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter’s written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum.

Documents shown or given to Commission staff during *ex parte* meetings are deemed to be written *ex parte* presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written *ex parte* presentations and memoranda summarizing oral *ex parte* presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (*e.g.*, .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission’s *ex parte* rules.

For further information, contact Chris Smeenck, Attorney Advisor, Operations and Emergency Management Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1630 or Chris.Smeenck@fcc.gov.

⁵² 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200 *et seq.*